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 Abstract 
The paper presents time-series analyses of corporate profitability in seven 
leading developing countries (DCs) using the common methodology of the 
persistence of profitability (PP) studies and systematically compares the results 
with those for advanced countries (ACs).  Surprisingly, both short- and long-
term persistence of profitability for DCs are found to be lower than those for 
ACs.  The paper concentrates on economic explanations for these findings.  It 
also reports the results on the persistence of the two components of profitability 
- capital-output ratios and profit margins.  These too raise important general 
issues of economic interpretation for PP studies which are outlined. 
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 I.  Introduction 
This paper examines empirically the dynamics of the competition process in 
product markets in emerging economies, using the common methodology of 
"the persistency of profitability" (PP) studies in industrial organization. This 
methodology has been applied extensively, mainly to advanced countries 
(ACs)
1. Time series analyses of profitability  persistence in seven leading 
developing countries (DCs), Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico 
and Zimbabwe are reported here for 339 firms generally spanning the period 
1980 to 1995.   
 
The paper is a sequel to Glen, Lee and Singh (2001), henceforth GLS, which 
suggested that the persistency coefficients for the above sample DCs were 
generally smaller than those observed for ACs.
2 This could normally be taken 
to indicate that the intensity of competition in DCs is more, and certainly not 
less, than that observed for the latter countries. It is a counterintuitive finding as 
DC markets are conventionally regarded as lacking in competition. As Singh 
[2002] notes that there is prima facie a solid basis for such thinking.  There are 
a range of structural factors which are inimical to competition in DCs including 
government created barriers to entry and exit, small and segmented markets, 
infra-structural  and transportation deficits.  These raise the question whether 
the persistency results for DCs need a different economic interpretation from 
those for ACs. A satisfactory answer to this question would requires a full 
discussion of all the parameters of the reduced form auto-regressive equation 
normally used in PP studies and not just the short-term persistency coefficients 
that received most attention in GLS.  All these parameters and their correlations 
have important implications for competition dynamics. One central focus of 
this paper is therefore economic explanations for the comparative results 
regarding intensity of competition, both between developing and advanced 
countries and between developing countries themselves. 
 
However, in conducting these empirical exercises the paper also includes an 
econometric methodology not previously employed in PP studies. Most 
research in this genre has either not undertaken unit root analysis or has arrived 
at inconclusive results owing to the low power of the tests used. Goddard and 
Wilson (1999) and Kambhampati (1995) cannot reject the unit root hypothesis 
in the vast majority of cases using standard methods. This creates difficulties 
for the statistical and economic interpretation of empirical results in PP studies.  
We overcome these problems by using the more powerful Im-Pesaran test that, 
by exploiting the panel structure of the data, allows us to reject non-stationarity 
of profitability. 
 
 The paper's second main focus comprises analyses of the persistency of two 
components of profitability: the profit margin (the ratio of profits to sales) and 
capital productivity (the output/capital ratio).
3 This exercise, not carried out 
previously either for advanced or developing countries, is important in its own 
right but its results also have a bearing on the classic Demsetz (1974, 1989) 
conundrum of whether the superior profitability of large firms is due to their 
greater efficiency or to greater market power. This issue is addressed here by 
investigating whether there is greater persistency of monopoly power or of 
economic efficiency.  The analysis in this case also raises, inter alia, important 
issues of economic interpretation for the PP studies in general.  
 
Further, in view of (a) the increasing national and international policy 
significance of the nature and degree of competition in emerging markets; (b) a 
paucity of systematic studies of competition in these countries and (c) widely 
conflicting views of economists on the subject, the present paper contributes by 
providing new comparative international information on competition dynamics 
in leading DCs.
4 In addition, by comparing competition dynamics in DCs and 
ACs in its various aspects, the paper contributes to PP studies and to our 
understanding of the economics of competition in countries at different stages 
of development.  
 
 
II. Persistence of Profitability and Intensity of Competition 
Static measures of concentration inadequately reflect competition intensity 
since, despite high industry concentration ratios, competition between 
oligopolistic firms may be intense over market share, design, sales, etc.  Such 
competitive dynamics may be better captured by examining the persistence of 
corporate rates of return. If competition is intense there is unlikely to be 
persistency in the profitability of competing firms.  Those with above average 
profits in one period will not be expected to maintain the same level of profits 
in the subsequent period since they will be eroded by competitors.  With less 
intense competition, profitability differences between firms may be more 
persistent. 
 
This essentially Schumpetarian perspective on the competition process has been 
adopted in PP studies, which are typically based on estimation of the following 
first-order auto-regressive equation for corporate profitability. 
 
Pit = αi  + λiPit-1 + Ui t        
  (1) 
 where Pit  is the profitability of firm i in time t, αi and λi are the parameters to be 
estimated,  and Uit is the usual error term.  The coefficient λi is interpreted as 
the speed of adjustment of excess profits to the norm and, if λi(-1,1), the 
equilibrium or long-run profitability level of firm i is given by: 
 
PiLR = αi / (1 - λi)       (2) 
 
As Geroski (1990) notes, (1) is best regarded as a reduced form of a more 
elaborate structural model involving entry, threatened entry and exit of firms.  
Since threatened entry cannot be observed, this makes it difficult to estimate the 
structural model. 
 
Equation (1) has the virtue of not requiring any unobservable variables to map 
competitive dynamics. However, the equation does not differentiate between 
different sources of persistency, specifically those arising from persistent 
monopoly power or those due to continuous good management and hence 
persistent efficiency. Entry and exit forces which erode excess profits apply to 
both sources of such profits. 
 
Although (1) is a simple statistical model, its coefficients, associated estimate 
of PiLR, the variance of Uit, and cross-firm variation in these statistics all have 
economic significance for competition dynamics, as do the correlations 
between some of these and other relevant variables. 
 
 
III. Persistence of profits in DCs: Time Series Analysis 
We report results from three different persistency studies: the persistence of 
profitability, profit margins and capital/output ratios. We first outline the 
statistical methodology as well as the economic issues concerned with the 
persistence of profitability, and then examine the persistency of the two 
components. As the methodology is the same for all three exercises, this will be 
discussed in some detail. Despite its brief methodological and economic 
discussions, GLS contained the full empirical results for the profitability 
regressions and only summary findings from that exercise will be included here.  
 
The data set consists of accounting information on after-tax profits (R), total 
assets (K) and sales (S), which are used to generate for each firm  annual time-
series on profitability (R/K), profit margins (R/S) and output capital ratios (S/K).  
The sample is a subset of the largest 100 corporations quoted on the stock 
markets of the seven countries mentioned earlier. The subset represents those 
firms in each country which have a common run of data in excess of 10 
 observations; firms with broken runs of data are excluded on the grounds that 
time series methods are inapplicable with such short time series.
5  
 
In the profitability exercise, Pit is defined as earnings after tax divided by total 
assets. Graph 1 provides the means of corporate profitability for each country. 
These rates of return are similar to those reported for the larger data set by Glen, 
Singh and Mathias (1999).   
 






























































































Source: Constructed from the data-base used for this paper. For details of the data-base see 
Section II and footnote 5. 
  
 
Following the literature, the regression analysis is undertaken on the transformed 
profitability measures Yit = Pit -Pt, where Pt is the average profitability across 
firms. The measure Yit represents the deviation of firm i's profitability at time t 
from the profitability of all other firms in the country at that time. This should 
help to control for the business cycle and other common factors which affect all 
firms.  The analysis is based on models of the form  
Yit = i + 1i Yi(t-1) + 2i Yi(t-2) + it      (3) 
where i, 1i and 2i are coefficients and the it are random errors. The empirical 
analysis shows that this  model is sufficient to capture the dynamics in all cases 
in our countries.  
 
From (3), the statistic YiLR = αi / (1-λ1i - λ2i) can be derived to indicate firm i's 
long-term profitability relative to the country average.  If 2i=0, then the estimate 
of  1i provides a direct measure of the speed of adjustment of profitability 
following a shock. Assuming λ1i(0,1), adjustment to equilibrium is monotonic.  
Where 2i is not zero or λ1i (-1, 0), adjustment is non-monotonic and there is no 
unique way of characterising its speed based on the estimated parameters. [See 
further Goddard and Wilson (1999)]. 
 
Testing for the presence of unit roots 
The presence of a unit root, which indicates that shocks to profitability persist 
indefinitely, implies that (3) can be written in first difference form. Tests of the 
unit root hypothesis have notoriously low power and that problem is 
compounded in our case since we have a small number of time series 
observations for each firm. However, a relatively powerful test of the unit root 
hypothesis is provided by Im et al. (1997) in situations where the data under 
investigation also have a cross-sectional dimension. The ‘standardised t-bar test’ 
proposed by Im et al. exploits the panel structure of the data and is based on the 
average value of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic calculated for each of the 
individual firm's data, adfi; i.e. the average value of the t-statistic on the 
coefficient  i in the rewritten version of (3) given by the Dickey-Fuller 
regression: 
 
Yit = i + i Yi(t-1) + i Yi(t-1) + it    (4) 
 
where Yit = Yit – Yi(t-1)  and comparing the model with (3), i= -[1-1i-2i]= -[1-
i] and i= -2i. To take into account the short time series available while 
recognising the requirement that the it do not display serial correlation, we 
 calculated two sets of tests of the unit root hypothesis in our seven countries; in 
the first (unrestricted) set, Yi(t-1) is included in all regressions while, in the 
second (parsimonious) set, the test is conducted on the basis of regressions 
chosen through a specification search in which the Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion 
(SBC) is calculated to decide whether or not to exclude the lagged Yi,t-1 term.  
In both cases the appropriate standardised  t-bar statistic is calculated and 
compared to the relevant critical values.  
 
Table 1. Persistence of profitability: Summary of results on the estimated 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions 
  
 
  i  i                          adfi      R i
 2 Y iLR 
 
Brazil  
Mean    -0.001 (0.005)   0.013 (0.050)  -2.743     0.418     0.003 (0.050) 
St. dev.     0.071     0.345     1.009    0.187     0.060 
 
India  
Mean     0.003 (0.003)   0.221 (0.059)  -2.180      0.326     0.000 (0.192) 
St. dev.     0.052     0.433     1.187     0.255     0.062 
 
Jordan  
Mean      0.008 (0.005)   0.348 (0.063)   -2.447      0.299      0.051 (0.099) 
St. dev.     0.040      0.318     1.003     0.167     0.214 
 
Korea  
Mean     0.001 (0.001)    0.323 (0.030)   -2.568      0.300      0.005 (0.462) 
St. dev.    0.018     0.381     1.694     0.226     0.037 
 
Malaysia  
Mean    -0.001 (0.002)   0.349 (0.037)  -2.326      0.302      0.009 (0.080)  
St. dev.    0.042     0.319     1.090     0.219     0.067 
 
Mexico  
Mean    -0.005 (0.004)    0.222 (0.056)   -2.269      0.316     -0.002 (0.238) 
St. dev.    0.041     0.281      0.797     0.182     0.048 
 
Zimbabwe  
Mean    -0.005 (0.003)   0.421 (0.042)  -2.225      0.249      0.157 (4.048) 
St. dev.    0.043     0.338     1.097     0.182     0.977  
 
Notes.Coefficients i, i  refer to the parameters of the Dickey-Fuller regression of (4) in the text, 
where i = i -1. The adfi are the t-values associated with i  in the same regressions, and theR
2
i also 
relate to these regressions. YiLR = i / (1-i ). The reported statistics refer to the distribution of the 
statistics across the firms within the country (Standard errors are in parentheses). The reported 
regressions are the outcome of a specification search in which i is set equal to zero according to the 
SBC. 
Source:  Summary statistics extracted from GLS. 
 Table 1 reports summary results
6 for each country by estimating (4) across all 
firms following the specification search described above. The results indicate 
first, that the inclusion of the lagged Yit term in the model is not required in the 
majority of the ADF regressions, but is required in a significant minority. In this 
minority, regression equations without the extra dynamics would be misspecified. 
Secondly, the fit of the regression is reasonable in most cases, with the average 
country R
2 lying in the range [0.25, 0.42].  The vast majority of individual 
regressions have R
2 in excess of 0.1.  
 
Thirdly, the results of the unit root tests (reported in full in GLS) suggest that 
this hypothesis is rejected in all countries, whether we use the results obtained 
from the parsimonious set of equations or the unrestricted set. The panel structure 
of the data set allows us to infer that profitability data is stationary. 
 
Fourth, the average values of i for the seven countries are in the range 
[0.01,0.42], with relatively small standard errors. These results suggest that 
nearly all of the impact of a profitability shock dissipates within 1-4 years. 
 
Fifth, the mean values of the YiLR estimates lie close to zero and are not 
statistically significant. However, the cross-sectional standard deviations show 
that there is considerable variability in the long-run profitability in some 
countries. This is because the YiLR is a ratio of estimated parameters (i /(1-i) ) 
and estimates of i close to or greater than unity can generate large (and   
imprecise) values of YiLR. To check on the sensitivity of the results to this 
problem, we have also estimated the regression models imposing the constraint 
λi(-1,1). This is achieved by noting that (4) can be re-written in a Moving 
Average version Yit =  i + uit, where  uit =  1i ui(t-1) + 2i ui(t-2) + it  and where 
i[1-1i-2i] = i. This model can be estimated using exact maximum likelihood 
methods. The results (see Table 2) are similar for the constrained and 
unconstrained regressions, but an inspection of the whole distribution suggests 
that some extreme values disappear. Given the similarity of the results, in what 
follows, we concentrate on the unconstrained results only.   
 
 
 Table 2. DC Corporations: Mean Values of Unconstrained and Constranied 
iacross Firms and the Proportion of Unconstrained Regressions which are 
Dynamically Unstable 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mean iMean constrained iUnstable Regression 
 
Brazil  0.013 0.025 0/56         
India  0.229 0.261 1/40       
Jordan  0.348 0.335   0/17     
Korea  0.323 0.310 3/82     
Malaysia  0.349 0.369 0/62   
Mexico  0.222 0.214   0/39 
Zimbabwe  0.421 0.421   1/40 
 
Column (1) reproduces the results of Table 2 showing mean value of i in each country. Column (2) 
shows the mean value of i obtained in regression models with the constraint that the value of i lies 
in the interval (-1,1). Column (3) shows the number of point estimates of i, which lie outside the 
interval (-1,1), in the unconstrained regression. 
 
Source:  Derived from the data-base used in this paper. See notes to figure 1. 
 
Section IV. Economic Interpretation of the Results and Statistical Biases 
 
Short- and long-term persistence of profitability and its cross-sectional 
dispersion 
A central concern of this paper is the implications of the statistical results for the 
comparative intensity of competition between DCs themselves and between DCs 
and ACs. For this purpose, further summary statistics for DCs on long term 
persistency (YiLR) are reported in Table 3. The corresponding (to those in Table 2 
and 3) results for mature markets by other researchers have been assembled 
together in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The main conclusion of GLS was that 
DC persistency coefficients (￿i) were not greater, but generally lower than those 
for ACs. Results in Tables 2 and 4 (which update the coverage of GLS) confirm 
that conclusion.  
  
Table 3. Statistics on Long-Run Profitability: DC Corporations 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   (1)   (2)   (3)           (4)      
   Mean  of  Positive Negative     




Brazil    0.003   1/56   3/56   0.099      
 
India    0.003   2/40   4/40   0.018      
 
Jordan    0.05   1/17   0/17   0.072      
 
Korea    0.005   7/82   2/82   0.254      
 
Malaysia   0.009   4/62   7/62   0.207      
 
Mexico    -0.002   0/39   0/39   0.300      
 





(1)  Mean values of YiLR 
(2)  Proportion of significantly positive YiLR  
(3)  Proportion of significantly negative YiLR 
(4)  Correlation between YiLR and Yio 
  
Table 4. Persistence of Profitability Studies for Advanced Countries: 
values 
 
Author                   Country    Sample     Observations    Number    Sample mean 
                          Period       per firm            of firms      (i ) 
 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) UK       1947-77          29     51     0.488 
         France    1965-82          18    55     0.412  
    Germany  1961-81   21   28        0.410   
 
Schwalbach et.al (1989)
a   Germany  1961-82    22    299     0.485 
 
Mueller (1990)                   US    1950-72          23    551     0.183 
 
Cubbin and Geroski (1990)  UK    1948-77          30    243     0.482  
 
Khemani and Shapiro (1990)    Canada   1964-82          19    129     0.425  
 
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990)  Japan    1964-82          19    376     0.465 
 
Schohl (1990)
b    Germany  1961-81   21   283        0.509 
 
Waring (1996)
c        US    1970-89    20           12,986    0.540 
 
Goddard and Wilson (1999)  India   1972-1991  20   335  0.45 
 
           (0.59)
* 
 
Odagiri (forthcoming)    Japan   1983-1997  15   357  0.50  - 
           0.59
** 
 
Source – Goddard and Wilson (1999), except for Odagiri (forthcoming).  
a - Based on nominal profit on capital, before tax. 
b  - Estimations are for industry groups. Estimates of  are from a range of specifications for the 
persistence model, which differ across industries.   
c -  Estimate based on pooled data for 128 industry groups.  The mean  has been estimated by the 
present authors from the data in Table 3 of Waring (1996). 
 Table 5. Statistics on Long-Run Profitability:AC Corporations
 
 
    (1)   (2)   (3)    (4) 
    M e a n    P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e     





United Kingdom 1951-77  0.108    37(15.2)  37(15.2)  0.339   
(243 firms) 
 
United States 1950-72    0.239    125(22.7) 149(27.0)   0.582   
(551 firms)   
 
United States 1964-80    -0.359   66(16.0)  137(33.2)    0.275 
(413 firms) 
 
Sweden  1967-85  -0.015   7(16.2)   8(18.6)     0.603   
(43 firms) 
 
Canada  1968-82  0.065   33(20.5) 23(14.3) 0.454     
(161 firms) 
 
Federal Republic of     0.007    53(18.3)  50 (17.2)   0.244   
Germany 1961-82     
(290 firms) 
 
France  1965-82    0.297   NA   NA     0.359   
(450 firms) 
 





Figures in brackets are percentages. 
Source: Odagiri and Yamawaki  (1990). 
 
More specifically, the average value of  i for DCs, whether constrained or 
unconstrained, is only about 0.27 (Table 2) while that for ACs is 0.46 (Table 4), 
i.e. about 60% higher.  Correction for small sample bias (Patterson (2000)) 
reduces the difference, but even the corrected average  for DCs is still  about 
30% lower than the AC estimates.   This difference is not only large but is at 
odds with the  conventional wisdom.  
 
 Nevertheless, even if the short-term persistence of profits is lower in DCs than in 
ACs, it might still be the case that the long-term equilibrium profitability for DC 
firms may exceed the normal rate of profit.  For example, Odagiri and Yamawaki 
 (1990), in their comparison of PP studies in ACs, found that while the short-term 
persistency for US firms for the period 1950-1972 was smaller than that for the 
period 1964-1980, the long-term persistency for the earlier period was greater, 
leading them to conclude overall that the forces of competition were stronger in 
the later period. In fact, the observed correlations in our sample of DCs between 
λi and YiLR (available from the authors) are quite low ranging over (0.11, 0.30).  
They are positive, but not statistically different from zero in five countries and 
are barely significant in the other two (Zimbabwe and Malaysia).  
 
To investigate the question of comparative long-term persistence of profitability 
in emerging and mature markets, Tables 3 and 5 report on the distribution of YiLR 
as well as the proportion of individual firms for which the YiLRs are either 
significantly positive or negative.  The two tables also provide the correlation 
coefficients between YiLR and Yi0. (where Yi0 is the initial value of Yit). A high 
correlation between YiLR and Yi0 indicates that firms with high initial profitability 
are also the ones which have high long-term profitability, suggesting long-term 
persistence.  
 
Tables 3 and 5 indicate that, in general, DC firms, relative to their AC 
counterparts, have lower average YiLR; and there are fewer corporations in DCs 
than in ACs with long-term profitability significantly different from normal 
profitability. The correlation between YiLR and Yi0 is in general lower for DCs 
than for ACs suggesting that firms for which long-run profitability exceeded 
normal profitability in the former country grouping were less likely to be those 
which also had high initial profitability.  Using the same basic ideas, the evidence 
contained in Table 3 suggests that among DCs, Brazil and Mexico display a 
relatively lower long-term persistence than Korea, Malaysia and India, as was the 
case with short-term persistence of profits. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, 
where short-term persistency was the highest, evidence suggests less long-term 
persistency than, for example, in Korea and Malaysia. 
 
There is, however, one dimension for which some evidence apparently suggests 
that AC firms display greater intensity of competition realtive to DC firms.  
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990), Odagiri (1994) and Maruyama and Odagiri 
(forthcoming) show that in ACs the variance of YiLR is smaller than that for Yio.  
This is interpreted as a tendency to convergence towards a common rate of 
return because of competition.  Our results for DCs, however, show that the 
variance of YiLR is not always smaller than that for Yi0.  The results (available 
from the authors) indicate that, for three countries, the standard deviation of 
YiLR exceeds that of Yio and it is smaller for the other four countries. However, 
as we know from the convergence literature on economic growth (see Lee et 
 al., (1997), it is not correct to infer convergence or the lack of it from the 
changes in cross-sectional dispersion of firm profitability in the generally short 
sample periods available.  This is because, in the evolution of firm profitability 
over time, the dispersion of profitability at any date can be high or low 
depending on model evolution.  Thus, describing profitability by a simplified 
version of (3) in which λ2I = 0 and λ i = λ for all i, where the cross-firm variance 
in profitability at time T, σT
2, is given by 
 
   σT
2 =  λ T
2 σ0
2 + (1 - λ T
2 ) σ*
2 + (1 - λ T






2 are cross-firm variances of profitability in the initial period of 
the sample and that of the deterministic element of profitability, (α/(1-λ), 
respectively, λT
2 is the squared estimate of λ at time T,  and τ
2 is a measure of 
the typical variation of shocks to firm profitability. Even with a very long 
sample  (where λT
2 =0), comparison of 
σT
2 at the end of sample with σ*
2, 
calculated using estimated values of αi and λ is misleading since the observed 
end-of-period variation accommodates the effects of stochastic variability 
(τ
2/(1-λ
2)). But at shorter samples, where λT
2 	 0, the end-of-sample variation 
could be dominated by the value of σ0
2 which may be small or large. Thus, it is 
difficult to attribute any greater strength of competition to the compression of 
the range of long-run profitability relative to that of initial profitability.   
 
To sum up, on the normal interpretation of the empirical results, one would 
conclude that competition is more intense in DCs than in ACs as measured both 
by the persistence of short- and long-term profitability.  Before accepting this 
result, we  consider  possible statistical biases which may render it invalid.    
 
Statistical validity of the results 
 Many biases could affect the statistical analysis of data from both DCs and 
ACs.   These may not necessarily affect the overall conclusions of the present 
study because the same methodology has been applied to both country groups. 
It is unlikely that biases such as that of survivorship and the use of accounting 
instead of economic rates of return would disproportionately understate DC 
profit persistency relative to that of ACs.  With respect to the accounting data it 
should be noted that the samples consist of the largest publicly-listed DC 
corporations  and therefore the quality of the accounting data is likely to be 
reliable.  It is true that, because of higher inflation in developing countries, 
historic cost-accounting data may introduce more distortions for DCs than for 
ACs.  However, for two of the most inflation-prone countries (Brazil and 
Mexico) data has been adjusted for inflation.  Indeed, as noted in Whittington, 
Saporta and Singh (1997), Brazilian authorities have made pioneering 
 contributions to the inflation adjustment of corporate accounts.  In the case of 
survivorship bias, there is no reason to believe a priori that firms excluded 
from the top 100 quoted companies are likely to have greater or lower 
persistence of profitability than the surviving firms.  'Dropouts' from the top 
one hundred may have persistently low profits and not just low profits.   
Importantly, there is no compelling reason to expect differences in this respect 
between ACs and DCs
7.  Of course, it must be accepted that our results may not 
apply to the whole population of firms, but only to the largest firms. 
 
Similar arguments apply to the broader challenges to PP methodology which 
have been put forward in recent research.  Goddard and Wilson (1999), for 
example, have suggested that the standard procedures used in PP studies tend to 
considerably understate the true values of λ.
8 However, as in the cases 
mentioned earlier, there is no reason to believe that such more serious 
reservations are likely to affect DCs differently from ACs.   
 
There are, however, other biases which are specific to DCs or more likely to 
affect them that could account for some of the results.  The most important of 
these is the statistical bias due to the shorter time-series available for DCs 
relative to ACs.  The correction of this bias, as noted earlier, does not change 
the central conclusions of the study. Another possible source of a specific DC 
bias arises from the fact that the economic environment in these countries is 
usually more volatile than that found in ACs.  However, as noted in GLS, a 
more volatile environment is likely to affect R
2 rather than the persistency 
coefficients.  The coefficients in a more volatile environment would be 
measured with less precision, but would not be systematically higher or lower. 
The R
2 for DCs in the present exercise are reported in Table 1.  Corresponding 
statistics from three ACs  from Geroski and Jacquemin (1988, Table 1, page 
382) confirm that these three ACs have higher average short- as well as long-
term persistency of rates of return, and also a higher average R
2 than do the 
sample DCs. 
 
Economic plausibility of the results 
 In examining economic plausibility, the first point is the one made in some 
detail in Singh (2002): while there are a number of structural factors in DCs 
which may discourage competition, there also exist many which  encourage it. 
To illustrate, the 'sunk costs' of entry, all else being equal, are likely to be far 
lower in DCs than in ACs. This is partly because the nature of demand in these 
countries is often less sophisticated and consists of simple products. Partly it is 
due to poor infrastructure and the lower levels of economic integration in DCs, 
which make it easier for new firms to enter the market. These points are 
 demonstrated in Hopenhayn's (1992) model of stochastic firm growth in which 
entry, exit and size distribution appear as endogenous variables and in which 
the size of sunk costs has an important bearing on the outcomes.  In that model, 
lower sunk costs lead to more entry, more exit, more mobility and more 
competition. In contrast, in ACs large corporations have created barriers to 
entry through advertising, patents, trademarks, etc. which raise sunk costs and 
inhibit competition. 
 
A second pro-competition structural factor is the faster rate of growth of DC 
economies relative to ACs.  Growth should lead to a faster increase in the size 
of the market that would attract new entry and lead to greater competition. This 
result does not follow from Hopenhayn (1992) since that assumes perfect 
competition and, in the model equilibrium, the number of firms rises 
proportionately with the market size. The result is, however, compatible with 
the further development of the Hopenhayn-type models that assumes imperfect 
competition in which entry is endogenous [Asplund and Nocke (2000)].  The 
main prediction of the model is that the rate of firm turnover is related to the 
size of the market. Further analysis and evidence on the interrelationship 
between growth and competition is provided by Odagiri (1994). 
 
Another structural factor relates to the role of the government in DCs which is 
not always anti-competition. Even though many DCs did not have formal 
competition policies until recently, they often used measures such as price 
controls to limit the affects of monopolistic practices. Further, many 
governments organised contests for the dispensation of assistance to firms.   
Indeed, Amsden (2001) suggests that it is only those countries which succeeded 
in developing institutions which would allow governments to impose and 




A fourth structural factor concerns the existence of large conglomerate firms 
operating in DCs in many different industries and which may also lead to 
greater competition as they permit economies of scale and scope that facilitate 
entry and exit.
10 The catch-up possibilities and faster economic growth in these 
countries also encourage entry and contestability, although some may argue 
that the causation is the other way around.
11  
 
It is an empirical question how these pro- and anti-competition structural 
factors will affect the intensity of competition in any country at a given time. 
Relevant empirical evidence is very briefly reviewed below.  First, turnover 
studies indicate that the entry and exit of firms in many DCs is larger than in 
 ACs.  For example, turnover rates
12 in Chile, Korea and Taiwan are 
considerably higher than those observed for the US and Canada. Tybout (2000) 
reports that in terms of job creation and destruction, Chile and Colombia have 
annual average turnover rates of 27% and 25% respectively, while the 
corresponding rates in the US and Canada are 19% and 22% respectively. In 
Morocco, the annual average job turnover rate was 31%.  Tybout (2000) also 
reports that in Korea and Taiwan, over five-year intervals, new entrants 
captured 33% to 44% of the market respectively compared to 10% in the US. 
Second, there is also evidence that entry-exit turnover relative to incumbent 
mobility is substantially more important in DCs than in ACs (Caves (1998)).  
Third, despite the statistical difficulties in accurately measuring the efficiency 
frontiers, available evidence does not suggest higher cross-sectional dispersion 
in productivity for DCs than for ACs.  In his survey of manufacturing firms in 
DCs, Tybout (2000) concludes that DCs have healthy turn-over rates in plants 
and jobs, demonstrate reasonable technology dispersion and exploit scale 
economies effectively.  
 
Thus, although our results may be unexpected, analysis and evidence suggest 
that they are economically plausible. Indeed, since this research, based on a 
different methodology to that of turnover studies, arrives at similar conclusions, 
it strengthens Tybout's thesis about competition and efficiency in at least the 
leading DCs. There is no presumption here that all emerging markets are alike 
in this respect or in others.  Although there are common structural features that 
DCs  share (such as low sunk costs) the balance between pro- and anti-
competition factors can be greatly influenced by governments through their 
policies and interventions. This can help explain in part the differences in the 
intensity of competition between the developing countries themselves. The 
interesting study of Korea and Taiwan by Aw, Chung and Roberts (2002) 
makes this point eloquently.  They ascribe the differences in the intensity of 
competition between the two countries to the relative size of the sunk costs for 
typical entry in these economies. 
 
Section V.   Persistence of Profit Margins and Capital-Output Ratios 
In this section, we attempt to gain further insights into the sources of 
persistency of profits by decomposing profitability into its constituent parts: 
profit margins and capital-output ratios. Then, expressing these variables as 
deviations from country averages and assuming the time series behaviour of the 
variables to be characterised by a model of the form in (3), the same 
methodology as in Sections III and IV is employed for these two components of 
profitability. The results, summarised in Tables 6 and 7, and reported fully in 
the Appendix
13, suggest two important findings. 
  
 Table 6.  Persistence of Profit Margins:  Summary Results of Time Series Analysis 
   i                         i                        adfi                
2
i R                                                              XiLR 
   Mean  Std Dev    Mean  Std Dev    Mean  Std Dev     Mean  Std Dev    Mean
 Std  Dev 
Brazil   0.006 0.143     -0.012   0.389      -2.664    0.868      0.405    0.179     0.004    0.128  
(0.011)    (0.051) 
(A = 44/56, B = 55/56, C = 7/56, D = 1/56, E = 2/56) 
India     0.002  0.055       0.197  0.446     -2.740  2.859     0.340  0.251     -0.002   0.067  
(0.003)    (0.055) 
(A = 31/40, B = 33/40, C = 2/40, D = 2/40, E = 2/40) 
Jordan      0.006  0.040       0.311  0.256     -2.835   1.295     0.335  0.184     0.000    0.054  
(0.006)    (0.062) 
(A = 15/17, B = 17/17, C = 1/17, D = 1/17, E = 0/17) 
Korea   0.000   0.028     0.373  0.346      -2.386   1.390     0.282  0.179     -0.002   0.048  
(0.002)    (0.031) 
(A = 66/82, B = 69/82, C = 2/82, D = 6/82, E = 5/82) 
Malaysia   0.002    0.079     0.285    0.373     -2.571   1.668      0.323    0.238     0.009    0.112  
(0.006)    (0.039) 
(A = 48/62, B = 51/62, C = 5/62, D = 6/62, E = 0/62) 
 
Mexico    -0.011    0.095     0.275    0.359     -2.301   1.340     0.308    0.231     -0.012   0.104  
(0.007)    (0.053)   
(A = 33/39, B = 32/39, C = 2/39, D = 2/39, E = 0/39) 
 
Zimbabwe  -0.005    0.047   0.313     0.382     -2.567    1.076      0.307    0.207     0.001    0.055 
(0.003)    (0.044) 
(A = 27/40, B = 33/40, C = 1/40, D = 8/40, E = 0/40) 
Notes:  Estimated coefficients i, i  refer to the parameters of equation (4) in the text, where i = i -1. The adfi are the t-values associated with i in the 
same regressions, and the 
2
 also relate to these regressions. X i R iLR = i/(1-i ). Reported statistics refer to the distribution across the firms within a country.  
Standard errors, in parentheses, indicate the precision with which the Means are estimated.  Regressions are the outcome of a specification search in which i 
is set equal to zero according to the SBC. "A" = number of firms for which i = 0 in each country. "B" = number of firms for which 
2
 exceeds 0.1. "C" = 
number of firms for which X
i R
iLR is significantly positive (at the 5% level) and "D" = number of firms for which XiLR is significantly negative. "E" = 
proportion of regressions which are dynamically unstable.  
18 Table 7.  Persistence of Capital Output Ratios:  Summary of Results of Time Series Analysis 
   i                         i                        adfi                
2
i R                                                                  ZiLR 
   Mean  Std Dev   Mean Std Dev    Mean  Std Dev   Mean  Std Dev   Mean  Std Dev 
Brazil    0.000   0.304     0.180  0.409      -2.556  1.267      0.357  0.232      -0.002  0.428 
(0.022)    (0.046)     
(A = 49/56, B = 49/56, C = 3/56, D = 3/56, E = 1/56) 
India     0.046   0.912      0.213  0.379      -2.346   1.202      0.345  0.208      -0.005   0.614 
(0.035)    (  0.055) 
(A = 26/40, B = 37/40, C = 7/40, D = 6/40, E = 1/40) 
 
Jordan      -0.003   0.407      0.460   0.386      -2.112    1.357      0.271   0.216      -0.607   2.083 
(0.043)     (0.059)   
 (A = 14/17, B = 13/17, C = 3/17, D = 2/17, E = 1/17) 
Korea    0.012    0.229      0.528   0.454      -1.905    1.298      0.223    0.227      0.046   1.439  
(0.012)    (0.030) 
(A = 60/82, B = 52/82, C = 5/82, D = 9/82, E = 5/82) 
Malaysia   -0.011        0.405      -2.008        0.259      -0.071     
(0.028)    (0.045) 
(A = 48/62, B = 50/62, C = 6/62, D = 8/62, E = 2/62) 
 
Mexico    0.002  0.253      0.286   0.343      -2.077   0.853      0.295   0.180      -0.016   0.278 
(0.016)    (0.057) 
(A = 31/39, B = 36/39, C = 1/39, D = 4/39, E = 1/39) 
 
Zimbabwe  0.041    0.357      0.488   0.263      -2.048    0.870      0.226   0.163      -0.180   1.270  
(0.022)        (0.040) 
(A = 37/40, B = 31/40, C = 3/40, D = 1/40, E = 0/40) 
Notes:  Estimated coefficients i, i  refer to the parameters of equation (4) in the text, where i = i -1. The adfi are the t-values associated with i in the same regressions, and the 
2
i R  also relate 
to these regressions. ZiLR = i/(1-i ). Reported statistics refer to the distribution across the firms within a country.  Standard errors, in parentheses, indicate the precision with which the Means 
are estimated.  Regressions are the outcome of a specification search in which i is set equal to zero according to the SBC. "A" = number of firms for which i = 0 in each country. "B" = number 
of firms for which 
2
 exceeds 0.1. "C" = number of firms for which Z i R iLR is significantly positive (at the 5% level) and "D" = number of firms for which ZiLR is significantly negative. "E" = 
proportion of regressions which are dynamically unstable.
19 First, there is strong evidence to reject the unit root hypothesis for both profit 
margins and capital-output ratios.
14 Thus the results for these two exercises 
conform to expectations from a statistical perspective. Both elements of 
profitability have been found to be individually stationary, as they must be, if 
their product is stationary. An important question, however, is whether these 
results are also meaningful from an economic point of view. 
 
Second, Tables 6 and 7 indicate that the persistency coefficients are larger for 
the capital-output ratios than for either the profit margins or profitability. Thus 
the average λ values for the capital-output ratios are nearer to unity (low 
adjustment), but still well below unity. If profit margins (P/S) can be regarded 
as an approximate measure of monopoly power, and the capital-output ratio 
(K/S) as a similar indicator of firm efficiency, then a straightforward economic 
interpretation of the results would be that, if a firm enjoys a temporary 
economic gain through better management or efficiency improvement, it is 
likely to be able to persist with this advantage for a longer period than if it 
acquires a temporary position of monopoly power. This interpretation would be 
compatible with the spirit of the Demsetz hypothesis and the Chicago view of 
competition, but, as is explained below, it is subject to significant caveats. 
 
It may first be objected that the inter-firm differences in capital output ratios 
reflect mostly technological differences between industries rather than 
efficiency. However, this objection may be overcome by making comparisons 
within the same industry.  Second, and more importantly, it may be argued that 
because the K/S ratio adjusts slowly due to the relative stability of K, the 
persistency coefficients for K/S would be biased upwards, unrelated to 
efficiency. The essential point is that profits will vary due to shocks to sales 
and other costs. K as such is constant and not subject to shocks. Changes in K 
are endogenous and are undertaken to keep K/S ratio at its optimum level. 
However, this argument is undermined by two factors. First, even if K is fixed, 
the K/S ratio can still reflect efficiency.  Better managerial skills in the use of 
existing stock could change K/S without changes in K.  Secondly, there is an 
important empirical point which is relevant here, namely, that the variable K 
(the capital stock of the company) is ‘proxied’ by the balance sheet value of 
total assets, that is, fixed assets plus current assets. The latter, which include 
stocks and work in progress, trade credit, etc. can easily vary in response to 
shocks. 
 
If, as a practical consequence of the point just mentioned, there were, at the 
margin no inherent large differences in the speeds of adjustment of K, S and P, 
then, for a particular sample of firms for a specific country, the persistency of 
20 profit margins could legitimately be compared to the persistency of capital-
output ratios because, in both cases, the industrial distribution of firms is the 
same. Under these assumptions, the corresponding values of λ would convey 
information on the relative intensity of competition forces affecting P/S and 
K/S.  Thus, in this case, the findings from Tables 6 and 7 would be compatible 
with the Demsetz hypothesis - if it is taken to suggest that the normal play of 
market forces leads to greater persistency of efficiency rather than to the 
persistency of monopoly power. 
 
Our full results also provide some evidence on the relative stability of P, S and 
K.  If K was inherently more stable than P or S, we should expect to find for 
most firms, ceteris paribus, a greater persistency for K/S than for P/S.  
Although in Tables 6 and 7 for each country sample the average λ value for K/S 
is greater than its corresponding value for P/S, the detailed comparative 
distributions of λ values for K/S, P/S and P/K indicate a more complex pattern.  
In one third to almost one half of the individual firms, λvalues for P/S were 
greater than those for K/S and there was a similar overlap in the distributions of 
these  λ values with those emanating from the time series analyses of P/K.  
Tables 6 and 7 and the underlying distributions for λ
 R
2 for individual firms 
also indicate considerable overlap for the values of this statistic emanating from 
the time series analyses of K/S, P/S and P/K respectively.  This also suggests 
indirectly that K/S, compared with P/S and P/K, is not any less subject to or 
systematically more affected by a volatile environment.  Thus the overall 
evidence from time series analyses does not support the view that there are 
inherent differences in the speed of adjustment of P, K or S. 
 
However, the results on the persistency of capital-output ratios can also be 
given a rather different interpretation which apparently contradicts the Chicago 
view.  This interpretation takes a dynamic view of economic efficiency and is 
more compatible with the basic economic framework of the PP studies.  It starts 
with the question: What is the comparative speed of adjustment of low (capital) 
productivity firms to converge to the best practice, that is, the highest (capital) 
productivity level? To address this issue adequately, we require a model of the 
diffusion process by which best practice is transferred from high- to low- 
productivity firms. While this goes beyond the scope of the present paper, a 
simple stylised model of diffusion is presented in the Appendix in which it is 
assumed that, given a distribution of productivity achievement across firms, 
each firm has a best practice reference firm that is placed randomly somewhere 
higher in the distribution. In this case, the 'typical' reference firm will generally 
move in line with the average firm and the time series properties of firm 
capital-output ratios, each expressed relative to the mean, provide a reasonable 
 indicator of the diffusion process. However, a comparison in these terms for 
any two countries in the sample can only be made if we assume that the level of 
technological development and the industrial distribution of firms is the same 
in the countries being compared.  Thus, for example, these conditions are more 
likely to be met in the case of Brazil and Korea than for the other sample 
countries.  These two are leading semi-industrial countries with a large number 
of conglomerates in the top hundred, which is our sample frame.   
Coincidentally, as Table 7 indicates, Brazil and Korea also have respectively 
the lowest and highest values of persistency coefficients in our sample of seven 
countries, suggesting a faster movement towards the best practice in Brazil and 
a more sluggish one in Korea. However, if the persistency of capital-output 
ratios is viewed in terms of the continuity of good management and economic 
efficiency (as in the case of the Chicago interpretation above), the assessment 
would be reversed: Korea would be the leader and Brazil the laggard.  Further 




In considering the  coefficients and the long run values of profit margins and 
capital-output ratios for individual firms, denoted by XiLR and ZiLR respectively 
in Tables 6 and 7, there are similar difficulties of economic interpretation. The 
main issue here has already been alluded to above:  is it reasonable to assume 
that, for individual firms, XiLR and ZiLR  would converge to a common 
competitive equilibrium value, as presumed in the case of YiLR (corporate 
profitability)?  It is important to note that the time-series methodology 
employed in this study does not assume that they do.  The results in Tables 6 
and 7 indicate that, barring a few exceptions (see statistic E), most firms 
converge to their own particular long-run values but not necessarily to a 
common equilibrium value.  For the latter condition to hold, it would be 
necessary to make the further assumptions that competition forces all firms in 
long-run equilibrium to have the same best-practice capital-output ratio and 
analogously the same equilibrium profit margin.  These assumptions are clearly 
unreasonable in general because of the inter-industry differences in capital-
output ratios and profit margins.  However, within the same industry they 
would appear to be no more heroic than to assume that competition forces firms 
in long-run equilibrium to have common rates of return.  On the basis of these 
assumptions for the long-term analysis and the previous examination of short-
term persistency, we now return to the two examples discussed above in 
relation to the latter.  First with respect to the comparison of the persistency of 
capital-output ratios with that of profit margins, Tables 6 and 7 indicate that for 
five out of seven countries capital-output ratios are more persistent than profit 
margins in the long-run, as in the short-run.  In two countries (Brazil and 
 Zimbabwe), long-term persistency of profit margins is greater than that of 
capital-output ratios, unlike in the case of short-term persistency.  However, it 
is important to note that in none of the seven countries the mean XiLR and the 
mean ZiLR are, statistically, significantly different from zero.  (See columns 9 
and 10 in Tables 6 and 7.)  Nevertheless, in each of the five countries referred 
to above, the number of firms with long-run capital-output ratios significantly 
greater or smaller than the norm is larger for capital-output ratios than for profit 
margins; though the reverse is the case for Brazil and Zimbabwe. 
 
Second, with respect to the comparison between Brazil and Korea in relation to 
the long-run persistency of capital-output ratios, in neither country is the mean 
value of ZiLR different from zero at the five per cent level.  More importantly, in 
the case of Brazil there are a proportionately greater number of firms which 
permanently deviate from the norm than in the case of Korea. Provided the 
underlying assumptions of the exercise are valid, and the comparison between 
Brazil and Korea is appropriate, this suggests an opposite indication to that 
provided by the analysis of short-term persistency coefficients for the two 
countries.  The difficulties of economic interpretation outlined in this section 
underscore the need for comparative time series analyses at an individual 
industry level in order to more fully understand the dynamics of competition in 
both emerging and mature markets.  However, the data requirements of 
sufficiently long time series for the relevant variables for the necessary samples 
of firms in each industry preclude such analyses for emerging markets for the 
moment. 
 
 VI. Conclusion 
This paper has carried out time-series analyses of corporate profitability in 
seven leading DCs using the common methodology of PP studies.  The results 
indicate that both the short- and long-term persistency of corporate rates of 
return for these DCs are lower than those for ACs.  This is a surprising result in 
view of the widespread belief that DCs tend to exhibit a low degree of 
competition. Despite this conventional wisdom, the paper suggests that there 
are good analytical and empirical arguments to support the view that these 
results are plausible, and that the normal interpretation of the negative 
relationship between the persistency coefficients and the intensity of 
competition continues to be valid for DCs as well. The paper also examines the 
persistence of two components of profitability - capital-output ratios and profit 
margins - and discusses the implications of the results for the Chicago view of 
competition.  We have found that there is more persistency of capital-output 
ratios than of profit margins which, under certain assumptions, is compatible 
with the Demsetz position of the greater persistence of efficiency than of 
 monopoly power. However, other interpretations based on dynamic efficiency 
and the speed of adjustment to best practice technological or organisational 
levels are also compatible with the data.  The latter are more in accord with the 
basic framework of PP studies.  
 
Finally, unlike previous studies that either did not explicitly consider this 
question, or used less powerful statistical methods, the present paper suggests 




1 PP studies for industrial countries include Mueller's pioneering 1986 and 
1990 contributions for the U.S., and those of Waring (1996) and 
McGahan and  Porter (1999); for the UK these include Cubbin and 
Geroski (1987,1990) and Goddard and Wilson (1999); for Canada, 
Khemani and Shapiro (1990); for France, Jenny and Weber (1990); for 
Japan, Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990) and Maruyama and Odagiri 
(forthcoming); for Germany, Schwalbach and Mahmood (1990). As 
explained in Singh (2002), in more general terms PP studies may be 
regarded as a part of a larger research program on the stochastic 
modelling of the firm and the evolution of markets overtime.  
2 Other DC studies are Kambhampati (1995) for India and Yurtoglu (2000) for 
Turkey.  
3 This decomposition follows from the identity P/K = (P/S) x (S/K) where P, K 
and S stand for profits, capital and sales respectively. 
4 For (a), (b) and (c)see further Singh (2002). 
5 A larger data set, incorporating all the normally hundred largest corporations 
in 10 emerging stock markets, was used, in Glen, Singh and Mathias 
(1999). The three countries excluded from the current paper, on the 
grounds that there are too few observations are Argentina, Peru and 
Thailand. The basic data  were originally compiled and used by Singh and 
Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995).  See further Booth, et al (2001). 
6 The full results were presented in GLS .  
* 0.45 is the usual OLS estimate and the authors suggest that this implies 
a true  of around 0.59. 
** Range of value of i.    
7 As noted earlier, the average rate of return for both the small subset of firms 
used here and the larger set examined in Glen, Mathias and Singh (1999) 
are similar. This suggests there is unlikely to be much survivorship bias. 
Goddard and Wilson (1999) found similar results for their UK data sets 
and argue that survivorship bias is not present. 
8 For example, their own analysis of UK companies using standard procedures 
gives a value for λ of about 0.45 while they believe its true value is about 
0.60. 
9 Japan is a prominent example. Despite government involvement and weak 
enforcement of competition laws, empirical evidence suggests that 
product market competition is no less in Japan than in the US (Odagiri, 
1994). 
10 For studies of conglomerates in DCs see Khanna (2000) and Singh, Singh 
and Weisse (2002). 
  
 
11 See further Amsden and Singh (1994). 
12 The turnover rate is the average of entry and exit rates.    
 
13 To save space, the Appendix is not included here; it may be requested from 
the authors. 
14 Results are reported in the Appendix. 
15 It is not a matter simply of the differences between the static and dynamic 
views of efficiency but also involves the question of the causes of 
persistency.  If persistency is due to normal barriers to entry and mobility 
assumed in PP studies  (advertising, product differentiation, etc.) it 
would be difficult to accept the view that the greater persistency of 
capital output ratios reflects greater efficiency; However, that 
interpretation would be more plausible if the greater persistency is due to 
the difficulties of imitating (say) the best practice management 
organisation.  Incidentally, Demsetz (1989) himself observes "Alleged 
barriers to entry such as advertising, vertical integration, and capital 
requirements all fall into the class of competitive tactics more likely to be 
associated with productive rivalry than unproductive monopolization" 
(p.205).  This conception of productive rivalry versus unproductive 
monopolisation may not be accepted by many economists.  On these 
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